European Defense Tech Hackathon - Prague
Prague, Czech Republic
Time to Accelerate European Defense Innovation 🚀
Start Building Things Together!
In this hackathon, it's all about cocreation and working together. So the first task is to find your team and tasks or even create your own. For this we have prepared a team formation space here on the page. Why don't ju just go there and check it out?
Join us and 100+ hackathon participants from all across Europe and beyond for the European Defense Tech Hackathon on May 15-17 2026, in Prague, Czech Republic with special Demo Day on a Field.
Want to come as a visitor? Join our EDTH Community here: community.eurodefense.tech
Goal
We want to bridge the gaps between technologists, the public sector, investors, and operators in dual-use and defense technology. This hackathon will demonstrate the talent and drive of the European ecosystem.
Get inspired by the challenges we have prepared, or feel free to bring your own project. You'll get feedback from military personnel with hands-on experience in defense operations to ensure you're solving real problems.
Our goal with the hackathon is to put you in a position to continue towards deployment.
Available Challenges
If you are a Hacker and in a team, please pick one of these challenges to work on and metion it in the edit dialog of your team.
| # | Challenge | Description | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Increasing fire intensity per UxV operator | Problem statement Design a concept/approach/system or parts of it lacking now, which will allow a strike unit to use multiple means of attack simultaneously. Key requirement One of the problems of the defending side is personnel shortage. Come up with practical solutions which could allow a single crew to operate multiple strike UAVs/UGVs simultaneously. Scenario Ukrainian forces are holding a frontline section where mechanised assaults happen regularly. When the armor is hit, the enemy personnel scatters and tries to escape and hide. There is often more enemy personnel than strike drones. |
Ukraine |
| 2 | Enhance security of strike personnel by pushing it further from the battlefield | Problem statement Design a concept/approach/system/components/tactics which will allow pushing as much of the friendly personnel as far as possible from the frontline. Focus on aerial strike drone squads. Key requirement In modern warfare, the "Rear Area" is becoming a blurred concept. We need to minimize the number of own personnel on the battlefield, including increasing the end-to-end operational range of own UAVs, deploying UGVs with combat modules etc. Scenario A unit doesn't require keeping the whole strike team (pilot, spotter, engineer) in close vicinity of enemy strike capabilities. |
Ukraine |
| 3 | Decoys as an integral element of the deep strike system | Problem statement Decoys are often deployed in isolation, without synchronization with actual strike assets, reducing their role to a momentary distraction. Key requirement In the modern air domain, a decoy must not merely "die"; it must expend the enemy's attention, interceptors, and time. Scenario In the modern air domain, a decoy must not merely "die"; it must expend the enemy's attention, interceptors, and time. |
Ukraine |
| 4 | Scaling deep / middle strike without increasing complexity and cost | Problem statement Most solutions are effective in small numbers but become excessively complex or prohibitively expensive when deployed en masse. Key requirement Mass is a key factor in penetrating AD and achieving strategic effects, but it is only viable if the cost of attrition is economically sustainable. Scenario A massed strike is planned and launched by a limited number of personnel, treating losses as a norm, while guaranteeing a systemic effect. |
Ukraine |
| 5 | Tracking and confirmation of deep strike results (BDA) | Problem statement Rapid and reliable confirmation of results following a deep strike is a critical component of the operation. Key requirement Deep strike without result verification becomes "faith in effect" rather than a managed system. Scenario Post-strike, the system determines whether the target is destroyed, partially damaged, or active — and proposes a correction to the plan. |
Ukraine |
| 6 | Friend-foe system for small UAVs | Problem statement Small UAV operations lack a reliable, low-visibility, and cryptographically secure friend-or-foe identification mechanism that works under radio-silence constraints. Key requirement Two-component system: 1) a compact device attached to a UAV; 2) a directed antenna-based device for human operators to verify UAV identity. Must preserve radio silence, resist MITM/replay attacks, handle device loss, and support periodic key updates via implicit input. Scenario Participants are to develop a cryptographically sound concept of a friend-foe system for small UAVs. Hardware implementation is not required but welcomed as proof-of-concept. |
Ukraine |
| 7 | Target detection through radio frequency emissions | Problem statement The enemy is increasing UAV capabilities. Existing systems cannot effectively detect small-sized UAVs causing significant losses to personnel and SOF logistics. Radar systems are limited in range and vulnerable to enemy radio-technical reconnaissance. Key requirement UAVs operate on distinct video transmission frequencies (Supercam ~1.3 GHz, Zala/Lancet ~2.2 GHz, Merlin/Orlan 2.6 GHz, Mavic/Autel 2.4/5.8 GHz). Initial approach should focus on specific narrow-band segments. Scenario RF detection module integrates with interceptor drone, providing real-time directional data on RF-emitting targets via OSD or ground control app. Future goal: BVR engagement based solely on RF detection, without visual confirmation. |
Ukraine |
| 8 | Secondary detection of enemy reconnaissance UAVs by interceptor | Problem statement Develop a secondary-detection capability to detect hostile reconnaissance UAVs within ~2 km of primary contact and provide prioritized cues to interceptors/pilots for faster visual acquisition. Key requirement Primary detections via radar/ELINT often lack reliable altitude or precise position. A reliable secondary detection capability within ~2 km would significantly simplify target search and increase chances of successful engagement. Scenario Primary sensor contact gives an approximate sector; the interceptor-mounted tool provides secondary detection with altitude, range, and azimuth, simplifying and accelerating engagement. |
Ukraine |
Visitors
If you’re curious about the outcomes and what the teams have built, you can join the Demo Day on Sunday as an EDTH Community visitor by selecting a Community Visitor ticket.
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